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SHOULD RELIGION SHAPE SCIENCE? 
~ilkaelStenrnark 
Alvin Plantinga has recently claimed that science is not religiously neutral 
because it often contains a naturalist bias. He argues that Christians should 
respond by developing their own kind of science (an "Augustinian science"), a 
science which is shaped by Christian beliefs and values. I agree with 
Plantinga that we can find contemporary scientists who presuppose meta-
physical naturalism in their scientific reasoning, but I shall also try to show 
that the reasons Plantinga gives why Christians should respond by develop-
ing their own kind of science are not convincing. Instead I argue that the best 
strategy for Christians and other theists to adopt is to expose naturalist bias in 
contemporary science and to maintain that religions or ideologies ought not to 
be included among the grounds for accepting or rejecting theories in science. 
Moreover, an alternative to both Augustinian science and "Duhernian science" 
is developed. I also indicate that some interesting parallels could be drawn 
between Plantinga and his idea of an Augustinian science and those who 
advocate a science shaped by feminism, Islam, or Marxism. 
A number of influential thinkers working mainly within the reformed tra-
dition of Christianity have recently raised serious objections against the 
way science is conducted and against the bias they think exists within the 
academy against Christian beliefs and values and in favor of what is called 
"naturalism," "secular humanism," "secularism" or "nonbelief.'" This crit-
icism has also led some of them to propose an alternative way of doing sci-
ence, a so-called "faith-informed science," "theistic science" or 
"Augustinian science." In this article I shall engage in dialogue with one of 
these thinkers, Alvin Plantinga. I shall examine critically his claims that 
science is not religiously neutral because we can find a naturalist bias in the 
work of contemporary scientists and that Christians should in response 
develop a science that is shaped by their own religious commitments. 
I. Naturalist Bias in Contemporary Science 
According to Plantinga a view that has been popular ever since the 
Enlightenment is that "science (at least when properly pursued) is a cool, 
reasoned, wholly dispassionate attempt to figure out the truth about our-
selves and our world, entirely independent of ideology, or moral convic-
tions, or religious or theological commitments."2 But although this view 
has received widespread acceptance, he thinks that it is wrong. The truth 
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is instead that science is not religiously neutral. This in a way comes as no 
surprise for Planting a because he, following Augustine, believes that 
human history is the arena of a great struggle between the City of God 
(Civitas Dei) and the City of the World (Civitas Mundi), between "the 
Christian community and the forces of unbelief."3 Therefore, science, just 
as any other human endeavor, cannot be expected to be wholly neutral 
with respect to this clash between opposed worldviews. It is even 
excessively naive to think that contemporary science is religiously 
and theologically neutral, standing serenely above this battle and 
wholly irrelevant to it. Perhaps parts of science are like that: mathe-
matics, for example, and perhaps physics, or parts of physics ... 
Other parts are obviously and deeply involved in this battle: and the 
closer the science in question is to what is distinctively human, the 
deeper the involvement.4 
Much of contemporary science is, however, on the side of the City of the 
World and does not serve God's purposes. More specifically, it proceeds 
from the assumption of metaphysical naturalism. By "metaphysical natu-
ralism" Plantinga means roughly the view that "nature is all there is: there 
is no such person as God or anyone at all like him."s He does not think 
that there is a neat recipe for telling which part of science is neutral and 
which is not in this contest. But the rule of thumb, Plantinga suggests, is 
that its involvement depends upon how closely that part of science is 
engaged in the attempt to come to understand ourselves as human beings. 
Hence we can expect that much of what goes on in economics, psychology, 
sociology and also in biology, especially in sociobiology, proceeds from the 
assumption of metaphysical naturalism. Christians must not, therefore, 
uncritically accept what the scientific experts say because of the naturalist 
bias that is present in much contemporary science. It might be completely 
wrong seen from a Christian perspective. 
Plantinga gives a number of examples from scientific practice to justify 
his claim that science is not religiously neutral. In an article in Science, the 
Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon takes for granted that the rational way 
to behave is to try to act in such a way that one increases one's personal fit-
ness, that is, to act so as to increase the probability that one's genes will be 
widely disseminated in the next and subsequent generations.6 The prob-
lem for biology is, however, that quite a few people do not act so as to 
maximize their personal fitness. They behave in an altruistic way. Simon 
therefore tries to develop a theory of bounded rationality to explain this 
non-rational way of behaving. Plantinga asks if this scientific theory is reli-
giously neutral. His answer is no. Perhaps this is the rational way to 
behave if one presupposes naturalism, but it certainly is not if one adopts 
instead a Christian point of view. According to Christians, altruistic peo-
ple, such as Mother Teresa, behave rather in the most rational way since 
they actually reflect the unselfishly loving character of God. Therefore, "in 
Simon's account of altruism we have an example of a scientific theory that 
is clearly not neutral with respect to Christian commitment; indeed, it is 
inconsistent with it."7 
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Moreover, Richard Dawkins and Stephen Gould, for instance, maintain 
that evolutionary theory is not merely the best supported theory of the ori-
gin of life, but established fact. In other words, it is virtually certain that 
the theory (or at least something approximating it) is true. But the episte-
mological probability of evolutionary theory depends in part on what you 
think about naturalism and theism. Its probability given the empirical evi-
dence is lower according to the views that theists hold than it is according 
to the views naturalists typically hold. This is so because evolutionary the-
ory is the only game in town for naturalists, whereas theism is compatible 
with it but allows the possibility that God could have created the world in 
a different way. Plantinga concludes that "the way in which the theory of 
evolution is not religiously neutral is ... that the view in question is much 
more probable with respect to naturalism and the [empirical] evidence 
than it is with respect to [Christian] theism and that evidence."B 
Plantinga quotes Dawkins, Futuyma, Gould, and Simpson claiming that 
evolutionary theory has shown or given us reason to believe that our 
species is merely accidental, that there was no plan or mind or foresight 
involved in it coming into existence. But Plantinga believes that "of course 
no Christian theist could take that seriously for a moment" because he or 
she knows that human beings are created in the image of God and, there-
fore, their existence cannot be merely accidental but is a part of God's 
plan.9 Again, science is not religiously neutral because it is inconsistent 
with what Christians believe to be true. 
Simpson, furthermore, in answering the question "What is man?" main-
tains that "all attempts to answer that question before 1859 [the year 
Darwin's Origin of Species was published] are worthless and that we will be 
better off if we ignore them completely."lo But this also is incompatible 
with Christian belief. According to Christians, the Bible (which is dated 
way earlier!) teaches us that we are created in God's image, that we are sin-
ners who need God's love and redemption, and so forth. So here again we 
have evidence that science is not religiously neutral. 
Hence it is evident that we can find examples of naturalist bias within 
contemporary scientific practice. But how should Christians respond to 
this? What should we say in the public debate about what science is and 
should be? 
II. Different Kinds of Augustiniall Science 
Plantinga is not satisfied with merely a Christian criticism of contemporary 
science and a disclosure of hidden or unreflected presumptions of natural-
ism. He wants to go one step further and maintains that"a Christian acad-
emic and scientific community ought to pursue science in its own way, 
starting from and taking for granted what we know as Christians."ll 
Christians should develop what he sometimes calls "theistic science," at 
other times" Augustinian science." What is then Augustinian science? 
Plantinga writes that "in doing Augustinian science, you start by assuming 
the deliverances of the faith, employing them along with anything else you 
know in dealing with a given scientific problem or project."12 Christians 
should in doing science appeal, when appropriate, to what they know 
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about God, or God's activity or to what they know by the testimony of the 
Bible and take these beliefs as part of the background with respect to which 
the plausibility and probability of scientific theories are to be evaluated. 
Christians can employ the basic tenets of Christianity in scientific prac-
tice in different ways: 
(1) stating and employing hypotheses according to which God does 
things directly, of course, but also (2) stating and employing hypothe-
ses according to which he does something indirectly; further, there is 
(3) evaluating theories with respect to background information that 
includes Christian theism; still further, there is (4) employing such 
propositions as human beings have been created in God's image, either 
directly or as background, and (5) doing the same for such doctrines 
as that of original sin, which do not involve any direct mention of 
God at all, and (6) deciding what needs explanation by way of refer-
ring to that same background.13 
Hence, the appropriate response to the naturalist bias we can find in con-
temporary science is to develop a specific Christian way of doing science. 
According to this view of science, it is acceptable that Christians start by 
assuming the truth of their religious beliefs and employ them together with 
everything else they know or at any rate think that they know in dealing 
with a given scientific problem. We would thus have within the Academy 
at least a naturalist science and a theistic science. Practitioners of naturalist sci-
ence and theistic science would sometimes say and do the same thing. But 
at other times they would not, because their research is shaped by the prior 
acceptance of different worldviews. We might have thought that there 
could and should be one common science, but instead Plantinga urges us to 
accept different worldview shaped sciences within the Academy. 
What are we to make of this proposal? Let us, however, before consid-
ering this question, acknowledge that Plantinga is by no means alone with-
in the contemporary academy to argue for this kind of conception of the 
scientific enterprise, although these people might of course think that sci-
ence should be shaped by another worldview or ideology than 
Christianity. Among our fellow theists we have Muslims who express 
similar ideas. They talk about a "sacred science" or an "Islamic science." 
Mehdi Golshani, for instance, writes that some people deny that "the idea 
of Islamic Science" makes any sense. "They argue that science is an objec-
tive and universal enterprise, and it does not depend on any creed or ideol-
ogy." But Golshani maintains that "this is a naive interpretation of scientif-
ic activity and that "Islamic Science," or for that matter, "religious science," 
has relevance at ... [both] the theoretical level and the practicallevel."14 
But also among Marxists and feminists can we find views that are strik-
ingly similar to Plantinga's view. The Harvard biologist, R. C. Lewontin, 
for instance, writes together with Steven Rose and Leon J. Kamin, that they: 
share a commitment to the prospect of the creation of a more socially 
just-a socialist-society. And we recognize that a critical science is 
an integral part of the struggle to create that society, just as we also 
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believe that the social function of much of today's science is to hinder 
the creation of that society by acting to preserve the interests of the 
dominant class, gender, and race. IS 
They thus believe in "the possibility of a critical and liberatory science," in 
short, (and in a less value-loaded terminology) in a left-wing science. 16 
Moreover, Sandra Harding maintains that we should not merely criti-
cize conventional science for being an androcentric science but replace it 
with a feminist science, that is, a "knowledge-seeking that is directed by 
existing feminist theories and agendas."17 Feminist science is "politicized 
research" which is "directed by feminist rather than androcentric goals."IB 
Notice on this point the similarity between Helen Longino's advice to femi-
nists and Plantinga's to Christians: Longino writes that "in order to prac-
tice science as a feminist ... one must deliberately adopt a framework 
expressive of that political commitment"19 and Plantinga that "a Christian 
academic and scientific community ought to pursue science in its own 
way, starting from and taking for granted what we know as Christians."2o 
All of these accounts are then Augustinian in the broad sense that their 
advocates maintain that it is legitimate to employ one's faith or ideology in 
doing science. They all start with an explicit commitment to a particular 
ideology or religion and then argue that it should in a profound way be 
permitted to shape the scientific activity. I suggest, therefore, that we call 
the generic form of this kind of view of science worldview-partisan science 
because it can be maintained also by people who do not see themselves as 
Christian theists or theists at all. Thus, feminist science (Harding and 
Longino), left-wing science (Lewontin, Kamin and Rose), Islamic science 
(Golshani) and Augustinian or theistic science (Plantinga) are different ver-
sions of worldview-partisan science. 
III. What Options Do We Have? 
How should we think about this matter?21 Clearly we face a very difficult 
but equally crucial question. Plantinga and these other science critics are 
right, I think, in that it is unrealistic to think that no faith or ideological 
commitments enter into the fabric of science. As a Christian, I am as wor-
ried as Plantinga about the naturalism that often seems to be presupposed 
in what many contemporary scientists write and say. The theologian John 
F. Haught even thinks that this kind of naturalism or materialism "has 
become so intimately intertwined with modern science that today many 
scientists hardly even notice the entanglement."22 This form of naturalism 
is often called "scientific naturalism." Roughly, it is the view that only sci-
ence provides us with a reliable path to knowledge and that the only 
things that exist are the ones science can discover: matter is what ultimate-
lyexists. (Scientific naturalism is also sometimes called "scientism.") In 
my recent book, Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion, I have tried to make 
the entanglement that some evolutionary biologists are involved with 
explicit and also tried to distinguish scientific naturalism from what I take 
to be proper scientific procedures.'"' In short, I have opted for the view: 
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(1) Scientific naturalism is not proper science because it is shaped by 
religious or ideological elements. 
But notice that if we follow Plantinga's advice we cannot really argue in 
that way. This is so because if we as Christians maintain that we should be 
entitled to let our religion shape science to such an extent that we find it 
appropriate to talk about an Augustinian science, then of course people 
who hold a different worldview such as naturalism must be allowed to let 
their worldview shape science to a similar degree. Hence, it seems as if 
Plantinga must accept that: 
(2) Scientific naturalism is proper science.24 
The importance of this point can be illustrated by Plantinga's attempt to 
criticize Fredric Crew for "failing to distinguish empirical evolutionary sci-
ence from a philosophical or religious patina added by those who embrace 
metaphysical naturalism," in Crew's review essay "Saving Us from 
Darwin."25 Crew responds by saying that what Plantinga really wants is to 
replace Darwinism with" Augustinian science" and explains that "this 'sci-
ence' takes as its starting point what Plantinga calls 'our knowledge of 
God'." 26 The issue that Crew probably had in mind but forgot to state 
explicitly (in a reply that leaves much to be asked for) is "How could 
Plantinga consistently criticize him for not distinguishing between empiri-
cal science and naturalist beliefs, if Plantinga thinks it is proper science to 
take as scientist one's starting point in Christian beliefs?" 
What Plantinga could, of course, consistently complain about and which 
goes beyond (2) is that Crew, Dawkins, Simpson and others tend to hide 
their metaphysical naturalism and try to sell it as a proper part of public sci-
ence (that is, as a science that is supposed to be free from religious or ideo-
logical commitments), when it is in fact not. Thus, his position might be: 
(3) Scientific naturalism is not proper science because the religious or 
ideological elements it is shaped by are not made explicit. 
However, as soon as Dawkins, Simson and these other scientists have 
made it explicit that they are starting from and taking for granted what 
they know or at any rate think that they know as naturalists (that God does 
not exist, that the only reliable path to knowledge is science, that matter is 
all that ultimately exists and so on) and that they are employing this 
together with everything else they know in dealing with a scientific prob-
lem or project, then it seems that Plantinga cannot demur. But perhaps this 
is not quite right either. The reason why is that there is actually one other 
way in which Plantinga could maintain that scientific naturalism is not 
really science, namely if his complaint were: 
(4) Scientific naturalism is not proper science because it is shaped by 
the wrong kind of religious or ideological elements. 
Scientific naturalism (or feminist science or left-wing science for that mat-
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ter) is not proper science because it does not assume the deliverances of 
Christian faith and only this kind of science is what we really should call 
"science." I do not think that this is the position Plantinga tries to persuade 
us to take, but it is nevertheless a possibility. Actually some feminists seem 
close to embracing (4) or something very like it. Harding, for instance, 
believes that II feminist natural sciences," when developed, would provide 
us with "ways to obtain less partial and distorted knowledge of the empiri-
cal world" than the conventional natural sciences.27 
As far as I can see, these are the options that are available to us and we 
have to make up our mind about which one we should accept. 
IV. The Regulative Ideal of Science 
Plantinga and also these other science critics have given convincing exam-
ples of when and how people's ideologies or religions enter into the fabric of 
science. So much is clear. However, we need to distinguish between the 
issue (A) whether science as it is done today (or in the past) is (or was) free 
from ideological or religious considerations and the issue (B) whether sci-
ence should be or strive to be free from ideological or religious considerations. 
Phrased somewhat differently, the term "science" can be used either descrip-
tively or normatively. Either we can mean by "science" the activities that sci-
entists are actually engaged in when developing theories and explanations 
(call this actual science), or we could mean the activities that scientists ought to 
be engaged in when doing science at its best (call this good science). 
Although it may be taken for granted that, for instance, theories some-
times-maybe even often-are accepted by scientists because of politics, 
religion, and gender, we may equally wonder whether that ought to be the 
case. For example, should we accept political, religious, or gender prefer-
ences as valid reasons for accepting or rejecting scientific theories or expla-
nations? The answer of course is not obviously "yes." It is thus not 
enough to display cases where we can see that faith or ideology commit-
ments have shaped scientific practice, to refute the idea of a worldview-
neutral science. It must also be shown that it is unrealistic or perhaps 
undesirable to accept that idea as a regulative ideal for actual scientific 
practice. Perhaps this could be done by arguing that there is no way to 
institutionalize scientific practice so that it can ensure that theories are 
accepted by the scientific community independently of ideological or reli-
gious concerns. Or if it is realistic, to argue that it is still better to let science 
for some reason be shaped by religions or ideologies. 
Moreover, we have to distinguish between those who claim that (C) sci-
ence in general is or should be influenced by ideologies or religions, on the 
one hand, and those who maintain that (D) merely parts of science are or 
should be shaped in such a way, on the other. Reflecting the former posi-
tion, Sandra Harding writes: "When we [the feminists] began theorizing 
our experience ... we knew our task would be a difficult one. But I doubt 
that in our wildest dreams we ever imagined we would have to reinvent 
both science and theorizing itself to make sense of women's experience."2s 
A statement like this seems to indicate that at least some feminists think 
that the whole scientific enterprise-at least up until the recent develop-
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ment of femIDist science-is ideologically biased. The view is then not that 
merely certain scientific programs or theories are expressions of male-gen-
der bias, but that science as a whole is disguised androcentric ideology. 
On the other hand, Plantinga writes, as we have seen, that it would be 
"excessively naive to think that contemporary science is religiously and 
theologically neutral, standing serenely above this battle and wholly irrele-
vant to it." Nevertheless, he continues in the next sentence: "Perhaps parts 
of science are like that: mathematics, for example, and perhaps physics, or 
parts of physics ... Other parts are obviously and deeply involved in this 
battle: and the closer the science in question is to what is distinctively 
human, the deeper the involvement."29 Thus, according to his view, while 
not every scientific discipline is religiously neutral, this critique does hold 
true for some of them or some parts of them. 
If we take into account these two distinctions, we end up with the fol-





















Whether actual science should be understood as characterized either by 
positions (1), (2), or (3), is a question that is open to empirical investigation. 
But I think that the examples Plantinga and other science critics have given 
are sufficient to show that position (1) is no longer tenable. My point, how-
ever, is that even if we reject position (1), that actual science is worldview-
neutral, we are not forced thereby to accept that science should be world-
view-partisan (position 6) or even partially worldview-partisan (position 
5). We can still argue that science ought to be free from ideologically or 
religious considerations. We can, of course, also make it a matter of 
degree, by maintaining that the fewer ideological elements that science 
contains the better. 
But the cake can also be cut in different ways. One way to distinguish 
parts of science from each other is to focus, like Plantinga does, on (E) dif-
ferent disciplines or subject matters. But another is to focus on (F) the ensemble 
of activities that scientists whether they are physicists, biologists or sociolo-
gists are engaged in when doing science. Scientists qua scientists choose a 
research area and problems to solve, develop hypotheses, collect and inter-
pret data; they try to convince their peers to accept their methods and theo-
ries; they publish their results in books and journals; they function as peer 
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reviewers both when it comes to what articles to publish and what 
research projects should be funded; they are involved in the storage and 
destruction of material used and in its application; they popularize 
research and explain the scientific results to the public; they function as 
expert advisers for private firms or governments; they teach and grade stu-
dent papers, they decide what courses to offer and not to offer; they 
encourage/ discourage students becoming scientists, they hire and fire peo-
ple at their departments and they promote or do not promote a certain 
social structure at their institutions, they are engaged in fund raising and in 
accepting (and possibly also in rejecting) funds from government agencies, 
private companies and foundations. In all these scientific activities ideo-
logical or religious considerations could playa larger or smaller role, and it 
is something we could encourage or discourage, accept or reject. 
V. In What Ways Could and Should Science Not be Religiously Neutral? 
We cannot, of course, discuss all of these aspects of scientific practice and 
Plantinga seems anyway to be more interested in some of them than in 
others. So let us examine those that Plantinga bring to our attention, with-
out forgetting that religions (or ideologies) could shape science in many 
other important ways as well. As we proceed it will become more clear 
what one exactly could mean when claiming that" science is not/ ought not 
be religiously neutraL" 
Scientists must first decide what is worth studying, what they want to 
spend their time, energy, and their own or other people's money on. One 
way of understanding the regulative ideal of science as religiously (or ideo-
logically) neutral is to maintain that it applies to this aspect of the scientific 
enterprise. Imre Lakatos writes that in his view "society ... has a responsi-
bility ... of maintaining the apolitical, detached scientific tradition and 
allowing science to search for truth in the way determined purely by its 
inner life."30 The idea is that science ought to be autonomous in the sense 
that the direction of research should proceed undisturbed and not be deter-
mined by any ideological or religious interests. 
Plantinga thinks that this is wrong. First, and as we have already seen, 
many scientific projects starts from and are motivated by naturalism. So in 
this sense science is not religiously neutral. Second, the Christian commu-
nity should not only point this out, but do science in its own way and from 
its own perspective, which includes "deciding what needs explanation" 
seen from that point of view.31 He maintains in his advice to Christian 
philosophers that "the Christian community has its own questions, its own 
concerns, its own topics for investigation, its own agenda and its own 
research program."32 So Christians because they are Christians have cer-
tain interests and find certain things, but not others, puzzling and thus in 
need of explanation. Plantinga claims that this is something we should 
accept in scientific practice. Therefore, we should reject the idea that sci-
ence ought to be religiously neutral in this sense. It is entirely appropriate 
that Christians let their religious convictions influence what they decide to 
do research on and what questions to ask. 
It is clearly the case, I take it, that there are certain things that rich but 
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not poor people, white but not colored people, men but not women, 
Christians but not naturalists, liberals but not socialists, or vice versa, are 
interested in and which will sometimes determine what they as scientists 
decide to work on or just as important, what they choose not to investigate 
or try to explain. Science in this sense is religiously or ideologically parti-
san. Should we try to prevent this kind of influence? Not necessarily. The 
development of science might sometimes even benefit from it because 
some topics, some things in need of explanation, scientists might simply 
fail to notice if they share too many interests or have similar ideological 
background beliefs. To take one recent example, consider women who 
have experienced that the society they are a part of denies them certain 
things, like equal opportunity irrespective of gender to be hired for doing a 
job they are qualified to do or equal salary irrespective of gender when 
doing the same job as men do. If these experiences together with the ideo-
logical interest to have the same opportunities as men determine that a 
group of female scientists decide to study the question of what causes the 
oppression of women, who has a right to complain? 
Hence, it seems quite reasonable to allow ideological or religious 
motives to guide what kind of research scientists get involved in. But it is, 
of course, extremely important that we realize that such a rejection of the 
autonomy of science means that ideological interests are in such a situation 
allowed to strongly influence what kind of scientific inquiries gets done 
and what kind does not. Thus, we should perhaps actively try to promote 
a direction of scientific research that takes into account the interests of a 
broad variety of groups in our society. Moreover, we ought probably to 
try to ensure that the scientific community consists of people with different 
ideological or religious backgrounds so that the research topics undertaken 
reflect the interests of different groups of people. On this issue we should 
go along with Plantinga, although I think that the question is more com-
plex than what we have been able to take into account in this context. 
There is another, second way in which Plantinga claims that science is 
not religiously neutral. Plantinga writes, as we have seen, that "in Simon's 
account of altruism we have an example of a scientific theory that is clearly 
not neutral with respect to Christian commitment; indeed, it is inconsistent 
with it."33 Positively speaking, this is one of the three ways in which 
Plantinga suggests that "a scientific theory can be relevantly related to the 
theological or religious claims characteristic of the theistic religions. First, a 
scientific theory may be incompatible with those claims."34 Here Plantinga 
seems to assume that science is religiously neutral only if it does not refute 
or undermine religious beliefs and values. But since that is not the case sci-
ence is religiously partisan. 
This is certainly a possible way to interpret the claim that "science is not 
religiously neutral." The problem, however, is that those scholars who 
advocate the idea of a science free from religions (or ideologies) do not 
think that science is or should be religiously neutral in this sense or at any 
rate they should not hold such a view. The reason is simply that science 
has over the centuries refuted or undermined numerous religious and ide-
ological beliefs which people have held. Let us recall a few beliefs of rele-
vance to Christianity. Science has discovered that the earth is billions of 
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years old and thus refuted the religious belief that the earth was created by 
God around 6,000 years ago. Religious people have held (and advocates of 
flat earth society still do) that the Bible teaches that the earth is flat and that 
we therefore ought to believe this. Science has refuted this idea and 
replaced a geocentric with a heliocentric worldview. In New Testament 
times and all through the Middle Ages many religious believers thought 
that people with certain symptoms, whom we today through science have 
discovered suffered from mental diseases, were possessed by demons or 
evil spirits. Science, furthermore, undermines the religious idea that Homo 
sapiens descended from just one couple, Adam and Eve. h, fact, science has 
the potential to undermine (or support for that matter) any religious belief 
that has empirical content. Here lies also the key to understanding why we 
cannot expect that science is (or should be) religiously neutral in this sense, 
because investigating empirical claims and developing theories about 
empirical states of affairs is what science is all about; it is its proper 
domain. If religious or ideological beliefs contain an empirical element or 
presuppose the truth of such an element, these beliefs can be undermined 
or refuted by scientific theories and data (and they can, of course, also be 
supported or verified by scientific theories and data). 
Therefore, we should grant that science could be worldview-relevant in 
respect to religions or ideologies, while it could at the same time be world-
view-neutral in respect to them. Worldview-relevance does not imply 
worldview-partisanship. Science, if worldview-neutral, would (on such an 
account) belong to neither side in a controversy, say between theism and 
naturalism or liberalism and socialism, but could obtain research results 
relevant for the truth-claims and value judgments involved in such a con-
troversy. Science would, on the other hand, be worldview-irrelevant if that 
were not possible. If so, all scientific research that might yield results, 
which are ideologically or religiously controversial in any way, would 
need to be abandoned. 
The difficulty with Simon's account cannot, therefore, merely be that it 
is inconsistent with Christian beliefs; the problem must be elsewhere. 
Where? Simon's theory about human docility and limited rationality is 
developed as he tells us within the framework of neo-Darwinism to 
explain the spreading of altruistic behavior. By "docility" he means the 
tendency we can find among humans to accept social influence. He writes, 
"Docile persons tend to learn and believe what they perceive others in the 
society want them to learn and believe."35 His idea is that "because of the 
limits of human rationality, fitness can be enhanced by docility that 
induces individuals often to adopt culturally transmitted behavior without 
independent evaluation of their contribution to personal fitness."36 
"Because of bounded rationality, the docile individual will often be unable 
to distinguish socially prescribed behavior that contributes to fitness from 
altruistic behavior."37 For these and some other reasons Simon concludes 
that docile persons will necessarily also behave altruistically. But then 
does this not mean that the really rational way to behave is to try to 
increase one's personal fitness? Is not the assumption underlining Simon's 
reasoning that if people were smarter (and perhaps a little less docile) they 
would be able to screen this culturally transmitted altruistic behavior and 
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instead behave in a (non-bounded) truly rational way? But why think that 
altruistic behavior is a manifestation of limited rationality? Why not 
instead think, as Plantinga suggests, that it is a manifestation of genuine 
rationality? Altruistic behavior is from at least a Christian perspective very 
rational because it reflects the character of God. So what is going on here? 
I suggest that the reason why Simon may assume that the rational way 
to behave is to try to increase one's fitness is that he (consciously or uncon-
sciously) interprets evolutionary theory scientistically. Simon assumes that 
neo-Darwinism is the whole story of human behavior. Maybe he shares 
with Michael Ruse and Edward O. Wilson the idea that "morality ... is 
merely an adaptation put in place to further our reproductive ends" and 
"in an important sense, ethics ... is an illusion fobbed off on us by our 
genes to get us to cooperate."38 Given this kind of perspective it is also not 
particularly surprising that Richard Dawkins writes, "much as we might 
wish to believe otherwise, universal love and the welfare of the species as a 
whole are concepts that simply do not make evolutionary sense."39 
Because if morality is merely an adaptation put in place to further our 
reproductive ends and if one also believes that evolutionary theory pro-
vides us with an all-sufficient explanation, what else can practical rationali-
ty be than maximizing personal and genetic fitness? 
If Simon shares these ideas with Dawkins, Ruse and Wilson then the 
problem for Christians who maintain that science should be religiously 
neutral is not really that his theory of bounded rationality is inconsistent 
with their religious convictions. The difficulty is, more precisely, that his 
and other biologists' account presupposes the prior acceptance of a rival 
worldview or ideology, namely scientific naturalism. But a Christian can 
rightly point out that claims like "only science provides us with a reliable 
path to knowledge" and "the only things that exist are the ones science can 
discover, that is, matter is what ultimately exists," are not scientific claims 
or entailed by such claims and that scientific inquiry can without any prob-
lems whatsoever be conducted without making these kinds of epistemo-
logical and metaphysical assumptions. 
This means that the regulative ideal of science as religiously neutral is 
probably best understood as a claim about what scientific investigation 
ought not to presuppose. Science should be religiously neutral in the sense that 
it ought not to presuppose the truth of any particular worldview, religion or ideolo-
gy such as Christianity, Marxism, feminism or naturalism. This means, more 
exactly, that ideologies or religions ought not to be among the grounds for 
accepting and rejecting theories in science. Theories should be accepted by 
the scientific community only in the light of considerations that involve 
empirical data, other accepted theories and intra-scientific criteria such as 
consistency, simplicity and explanatory power. Ideological or religious 
considerations are therefore illegitimate ways of deciding between scientif-
ic theories. They threaten the integrity of science. The basic idea is that you 
do not have to agree on what constitutes a good human life or society, 
what a just social order is, what the appropriate differences (if any) 
between the genders are, whether God exists and whom God is if God 
exists, to be able to evaluate scientific theories properly. The choice of sci-
entific theory should not be determined by moral, personal, ideological or 
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religious ideas, but by intra-scientific criteria. 
Is it not this that is the real problem also with Simpson's claim-which 
Plantinga brings to our attention-that all attempts to answer that question 
"What is man?" before Darwin published The Origin of Species in 1859 are 
worthless and that we will be better off if we ignore them completely? It is 
reasonable to assume that Simpson in telling us these things (and Dawkil1.s 
in quoting him approvingly) simply presuppose the truth of scientific nat-
uralism. Only if they take for granted that genuine knowledge can be 
obtained solely by employing the methods of science, does it seems reason-
able to state in this a priori fashion that all human inquiries of human 
nature before the development of Darwinism are simply worthless. Only 
by assuming not merely that "Biology after 1859 gives us knowledge of 
human nature" but that "Nothing but biology (or the sciences) after 1859 
gives us knowledge of human nature" or something along those line can 
Simpson and Dawkins as scientists maintain by implication that what 
Christians take to be crucial information, namely that we are created in 
God's image and that we are sinners who need God's love and redemp-
tion, are really worthless and that we will be better off if we ignore these 
ideas altogether. But "Nothing but biology (or the sciences) after 1859 
gives us knowledge of human nature" and similar pronouncements are of 
course not something that science has the means to confirm. On this point 
Simpson and Dawkins violate the regulative ideal of science as religiously 
and ideologically neutral by assuming the truth of a particular ideology in 
their scientific reasoning. 
The same analysis can probably be made about the claim-which 
Plantinga thinks a Christian cannot take seriously for a moment"'-made 
by Dawkins, Futuyma Gould, and Simpson that evolutionary theory has 
shown or given us reason to believe that our species is merely accidental, 
that there was neither plan nor mind nor foresight involved in its coming 
into existence. If all individual species that come into existence through the 
process of evolution are random (i.e., have a low probability) with respect 
to what evolutionary theory (or more broadly, the sciences) can predict or 
retrospectively explain and if the only source of knowledge we have is science 
(or more specifically evolutionary biology in this case), then perhaps it follows 
that we ought to believe that our existence is the result of pure chance or in 
other words it is not a part of anyone's plan and serves no one's end. But 
this is a scientistic and not a scientific argument because its second premise 
assumes the truth of scientism or scientific naturalism. Merely the first 
premise, the scientific one, is, however, compatible with the assumption 
that God knew before the creation of the world that human beings or at 
any rate intelligent life would be the inevitable product of the evolutionary 
process and that therefore we (or intelligent life) exist for a reason. 
It is therefore somewhat misleading to write that worldview-neutral sci-
ence, or what Plantinga calls "Duhernian science," "would be maximally 
inclusive and wholly neutral with respect to the word-view differences 
that separate US."41 On the contrary, worldview-neutral science might 
totally undermine a particular ideology or religion if it contains (or presup-
poses the truth of) many empirical claims that science can show to be false. 
The idea is rather that science ought not to grant a privileged status to any par-
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ticular worldview, ideology or religion in the sense of presupposing its truth in the 
way, for instance, Marxism was assumed to be true in "Lysenkoian" biolo-
gy in the Soviet Union or Nazism in II Aryan" physics in Germany. It is in 
this way, I suggest, that we should understand the idea that Duhemian sci-
ence (in contrast to Plantinga's Augustinian science) ought not to be ideo-
logically or religiously partisan but neutral. 
VI. Why Accept Augustinian Science as Good Science? 
Plantinga rejects the regulative ideal of science as ideologically or religious-
ly neutral also in this third sense. He maintains, as we have seen, that 
Christians as scientists should start from what they think that they know as 
Christians. They should in doing science appeal, where appropriate, to 
what they know about God, or God's activity or to what they know by the 
testimony of the Bible.42 These beliefs ought to be part of the background 
evidence with respect to which the plausibility and probability of scientific 
theories are to be evaluated. Hence, science should not be ideologically or 
religiously neutral in the sense that it should not presuppose the truth of 
any particular worldview, religion or ideology such as Christianity, 
Marxism, feminism or naturalism. 
Again it is well worth pointing out that Plantinga is not alone within the 
contemporary Academy in arguing for an Augustinian science or a world-
view-partisan science along these lines. For instance, Longino writes, 
The idea of a value-free science presupposes that the object of inquiry 
is given in and by nature, whereas the contextual analysis [that is, her 
own] shows that such objects are constituted in part by social needs 
and interests that become encoded in the assumptions of research 
programs. Instead of remaining passive with respect to the data and 
what the data suggest, we can, therefore, acknowledge our ability to 
affect the course of knowledge and fashion or favor research pro-
grams that are consistent with the values and commitments we 
express in the rest of our lives. From this perspective the idea of a 
value-free science is not just empty but pernicious.43 
With this last statement Longino claims that the very idea of a value-free 
science and, I assume, also a world view-neutral science, is dangerous and 
therefore ought not to serve even as an ideal. On the contrary, scientists 
should not merely make their ideological commitments explicit when par-
ticipating in policy making, religious or moral debates, and so forth, but 
they should also interpret the data in such a way that those theories which 
guarantee the reinforcement of their own social ideals will be validated. 
However, "in order to survive and attract participants" this must be done 
in such a way that "some of the standards/values characterizing the scien-
tific community within which it is proposed" are satisfied.44 Longino 
points out that on this issue neo-Marxists (like Lewontin) and radical femi-
nists have a similar view: "the neo-Marxists are understood as advocating 
an alternative vision of nature and natural processes largely on moral and 
sociopolitical grounds ... .In this regard the neo-Marxists stand on the same 
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ground as the feminist scientist. In order to practice science as a feminist, 
as a radical, or as a Marxist one must deliberately adopt a framework 
expressive of that political commitment."5 Ideological considerations are 
thus to be regarded as legitimate constraints on scientific reasoning. 
But why should we accept a world view-partisan science, in the sense 
that religious or ideological considerations should be allowed to playa 
legitimate role in determining which theories scientists ought to accept or 
reject? Does Plantinga really given us any good reason why we should 
develop an Augustinian science? 
What is evident is that he has given us convincing examples of natural-
ist bias within contemporary science. But, as we have seen, this is not in 
itself sufficient to support the idea of an Augustinian science. It is not suffi-
cient because one can still maintain that the appropriate way to respond is 
to reject these scientists' ideas once we discover that they are not merely 
based on accessible empirical evidence, but depend for their justification 
on the prior acceptance of certain ideological convictions. More precisely, 
as soon as we discover that scientists accept scientific hypotheses because 
they fit their ideological beliefs or values, these hypotheses ought not to be 
considered a part of the body of justified scientific theories. Science ought 
to be so structured as to discourage scientists from advocating scientific 
hypotheses because they fit their ideological or religious convictions. In 
good science, scientists should be encouraged to expose-and receive 
recognition for exposing-ideological assumptions functioning as control 
beliefs for what theories are accepted or rejected by the scientific communi-
ty. This is, in fact, also what has happen many times in the history of sci-
ence."; Perhaps Harding and Longino are right that many scientists have 
failed to see the extent to which male bias functions as control beliefs in sci-
entific reasoning and perhaps Plantinga is right that the same is true about 
naturalist bias in contemporary science. But as long as the scientific com-
munity can be constituted in such a way that it contains scientists who 
adhere to a great variety of religions or ideologies and these people's voic-
es are not silenced, we can slill, when it comes to the validation of scientific 
theories, continue to hold on to the non-Augustianian conception of sci-
ence as a regulative ideal for scientific practice. 
Plantinga seems to anticipate this objection because he admits that a pos-
sible response to Dawkins, Simon and other scientists is to maintain that 
when they say these things about rationality, purpose, pre-Darwinian ideas 
about human nature and so on, then they are not strictly speaking doing 
science because their conclusions requires the acceptance of certain extra-
scientific premises. But his comment is that this "is not really the important 
question for my present purposes."4? This is puzzling because he not mere-
ly says that his objective is to give examples of naturalist bias in current sci-
ence, but to "argue that a Christian academic and scientific community 
ought to pursue science in its own way, starting from and taking for granted 
what we know as Christians."48 But if one can on scientific grounds criticize 
Dawkins, Simson and these other scientists by pointing out that they pre-
suppose naturalism in their scientific reasoning, then one crucial reason 
why Christians should develop their own kind of science fails. Why devel-
op a theistic science if one can show that naturalist science is not proper sci-
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ence? (The same applies to ferrtinism: why promote a distinct ferrtinist sci-
ence if one can argue that masculinist science is not proper science?) 
Another reason why we should develop an Augustinian science that 
Plantinga appears to give is that since we know many important things as 
Christians, it would be unwise or unnatural if we accepted a constraint that 
did not allow us to use that information in doing science.49 Why should we 
not use everything we know in doing science? Notice first-given the dis-
tinctions I have made--what, the question concerns. I am not saying that 
Christians should not let what they know or at any rate believe that they 
know, influence the kind of research topics they undertake or the hypothe-
ses they propose or what already accepted scientific theories they want to 
take a second look at. What I am saying is merely that they should not claim 
that their Christian convictions ought to be considered a proper part of scientific 
theory validation. They ought not to maintain that Augustinian science in 
this sense is proper science. 
Because if they do, then people of other faiths and ideologies who also 
believe firmly that they know particular things as a result of their adher-
ence to these faiths and ideologies can claim that their "knowledge" also 
ought to be considered a proper part of scientific theory validation. But 
since it seems as if we cannot come to an agreement about which world-
view we should accept, we face a choice. We can either choose to (a) 
accept a pluralism of worldviews in scientific theory validation or try to (b) 
limit their influence as much as we can, and whenever a theory is accepted 
because of worldview considerations point this out and thereby disqualify 
it as a proper part of the body of scientifically justified theories. 
But, of course, it is easier for me and those Christians who are a bit more 
uncertain than Plantinga about whether they really know their Christian 
beliefs to be true, to accept this. (Those who perhaps understand their 
Christianity more in terms of faith, than in terms of knowledge.) But at 
any rate the history of science should make even the most convinced 
Christians hesitate before maintaining that their convictions ought to be a 
proper part of scientific theory validation. For instance, many Christians 
have really thought they knew that the Bible taught that the earth was flat, 
that the earth was at the center of the universe, and that God created the 
different species on earth in a fixed form roughly six thousand years ago, 
and for a long time--as we all know-these beliefs hindered the progress 
of scientific inquiry. None of Plantinga's reasons why Christians ought to 
develop an Augustinian science in this sense are therefore convincing. 
In conclusion, the regulative ideal of science we should accept is one where 
Christian or naturalist, feminist or masculinist, right-wing or left-wing con-
siderations are not allowed to playa role in determining which theories the 
scientific community ought to accept or reject. This holds true even if 
Plantinga and others are right that violations of this ideal in the actual life 
of scientific inquiry happen more frequently than we have previously 
thought. However, this does not mean, and on these points I think 
Plantinga is right, that scientists who are Christians should not let what 
they believe or know as Christians influence the kind of research topics 
they undertake, the hypotheses they develop or what already accepted sci-
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entific theories they want to take a second look at or their views about how 
scientific results should be used. We could therefore agree with Plantinga 
that "science (at least when properly pursued) is [actually not] a cool, rea-
soned, wholly dispassionate attempt to figure out the truth about ourselves 
and our world, entirely independent of ideology, or moral convictions, or 
religious or theological commitments."so But we could still reject an 
Augustinian science or a worldview-partisan science, if we by that means a 
science in which religious or ideological beliefs and values function as con-
trol instances of what theories ought to be accepted or rejected by the scien-
tific community. If we, on the other hand, by an "Augustinian science" or 
a "world view-partisan science" merely means a science in which 
Christians, Muslims, socialists, feminists and so forth are allowed to let 
their worldview convictions influence the kind of research topics undertak-
en, the hypotheses developed or what already accepted scientific theories 
need to be critically scrutinized again (looking for undetected ideological 
bias), or how we should use the results of scientific inquiry, then such a sci-
ence seems to be unavoidable or if avoidable at least acceptable, probably 
even desirable. Thus, the position taken here involves a rejection also of a 
traditional understanding of the idea of a religiously or an ideologically 
neutral science. It provides an alternative to both Augustinian science and 
Duhemian science (as Plantinga defines them).51 
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